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Constitutional Law
Is THERE A CIVIL RIGHT TO HOUSING ACCOMMODATIONS?
Introduction
The Supreme Court's inundation of the separate-but-equal doctrine in
the historic Desegregation Cases' has had a marked effect on judicial
and legislative thought in the entire realm of public accommodation. 2 The
thrust of Brown v. Board of Education3 and cases following is that the
Constitution demands that all persons have a civil right to be accommo-
dated on identical terms without discrimination on the basis of color in
public or quasi-public facilities.4 This Note will investigate their influence
upon discrimination in the field of housing. An attempt will be made to
determine whether there is today a civil right, which may be asserted by a
prospective tenant or vendee, to buy, acquire, lease, occupy, use, and
enjoy property and to obtain decent living and housing accommodations
without discrimination because of race or religion. Such a determination
will, of course, involve the inverse consideration of the landlord's free-
dom in selecting his tenants.5
Typically, the prospective tenant who will want to establish this civil
right is a Negro attempting to rent an apartment or to buy a house in a
comfortable neighborhood.6 Can he arm himself with the Constitution
1 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954) (prohibiting racial segregation in District of Columbia public schools).
The previously condoned doctrine of "separate-but-equal" facilities was expressly
rejected. A year later the Court commanded that desegregation be accomplished
"with all deliberate speed" giving supervisory power to local federal district courts.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
2 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (intrastate public transportation);
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (segregated
public beaches and bath houses); NAACP v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 297 I.C.C.
335 (1955) (interstate transportation facilities). See Survey, 2 RAcE Ra.L. L. RaP.
881-911 (1957).
Laws which have recently been passed forbidding discrimination are discussed at
pp. 477-86, infra.
3 See note 1 supra.
4 So stated, the right regards a willing buyer and his right to acquire property;-
the correlative right regarding a willing seller and his right to dispose of property
without "state" imposition of racial criteria was vindicated in Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
5 Henceforth the term "landlord" will be used frequently and should be under-
stood to include builder, subdivider and those who are in the business of selling or
renting lots and houses. A different meaning, if intended, will be made clear. Like-
wise, the term "tenant" will include prospective lessees and buyers of lots or homes.
The relationships between the various people mentioned, as considered here, are
essentially referable to the landiord-prospective tenant nexus.
6 The Negro will be chosen to symbolize the minority groups who are the
unfortunate victims of racial and religious discrimination. That the Negro feels this
problem most keenly is documented, to give a significant example, by the Supreme
Court itself in the Brown case. Moreover, Myrdal observes:
"Nothing is so obvious about the Negroes' level of living as the fact that most
of them suffer from poor housing conditions. It is a matter of such common
knowledge that it does not need. much emphasis." MYRDAL, THE AMERICAN
DILEMMA 376 (1944).
Today, however, spurred on both by economic progress and the increasing suc-
cess of minority groups in various courts, the. Negro has more reason to expect
attainment of first-class citizenship.
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and expect to overcome the discrimination so often encountered? Or,
rather, is our fundamental charter a weapon in the landlord's arsenal?
This presents the central issue, which is seen to be exclusively one of
constitutional law.7
It happens that except for three or four key Supreme Court cases the
most instructive and pertinent judicial precedents are several New York
state decisions. Much reliance, therefore, has been placed upon the ideas
therein contained-to illustrate the approach the judiciary has taken in
this area. This Note will also contain an evaluation of state and city
anti-discrimination housing laws which impose a duty upon certain
landlords not to discriminate or segregate, considering possible constitu-
tional objections to such a police power exercise in light of the societal
protectives of our Constitution. The recent New York City Law, being
the most fargoing of its kind, is singled out to illustrate the problems
involved.
The Approach in the Courts
A. Is Landlord Activity "State Action"?
Obviously, the key weapon of the prospective Negro tenant is the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment which is an "explicit safe-
7 The historical context of this problem is interesting to note. Prior to the four-
teenth amendment common law treated a property owner who rented portions of
his quarters to others as either a private home owner or as an innkeeper. One who
owned a home could treat it "as his castle" and do with it as he wished. See, e.g.,
Semayne's Case, 5 Rep. 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604) (per Coke). However,
an innkeeper, by opening his rooms to the public, assumed a duty to refrain from
discrimination. Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N.W. 718 (1890) (statute in-
volved); Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661, 680-81 (1873) (dictum). As a result of the
post-Civil War amendments, this duty was extended to the Negro, a newly re-
cognized citizen. Ferguson v. Gies, supra. It was at this point that the dispute over
"equal" protection began. West Chester and Philadelphia R.R. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209,
215 (1867) (separate-but-equal). Contra, Ferguson v. Gies, supra. The "landlord"
under scrutiny in this Note is neither the common law private property owner nor
the common law innkeeper but rather a juridical entity unknown to the common law.
Another common law idea which concerns the property owner-willing buyer re-
lationship is the rule against restraints on alienation. See Schnebly, Restraints upon
the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186, 1380 (1935). This aspect
of property law, however, is only peripherally pertinent today when racial problems
are involved, since the settlement of such problems has become almost exclusively a
matter of constitutional law. Compare Ribble, Legal Restraints on the Choice of a
Dwelling, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 842 (1930) and Schnebly, supra at 1190, "the problem,
then, is not one of constitutional law, but of the social expediency of racial segre-
gation at the expense of freedom of alienation," with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948), and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). The Shelley case held
racially restrictive covenants to be valid, in that they may be voluntarily respected
and no wrong is done by entering into such an agreement, but unenforceable, in that
a court may not compel performance of the agreement. The restraint against alien-
ation question was apparently neither raised by the litigants nor deemed important by
the Court; it is not mentioned in the opinion. The question of any practical ad-
vantage of racially restrictive covenants seems closed. See Scanlan, Racial Restrictions
in Real Estate-Property Values Versus Human Values, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 157
(1949). See also Capitol Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Smith, 316 P.2d 252
(Colo. 1957). But see Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242
N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
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guard of prohibited unfairness."8 Cases dealing with racial discrimination
have focused upon this clause or its parallel protective, the due process
clause of the fifth amendment,9 and have provoked significant remarks
by some of our most distinguished jurists that would seem to indicate
that any discrimination because of race or creed is unconstitutional per se:
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality.10
Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular
care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally
suspect"l
Yet, on its face the fourteenth amendment proscribes only state action;12
hence we find Mr. Justice Bradley stating in the Civil Rights Cases:'-'
"It is State Action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the [fourteenth]
amendment." (Emphasis added.) But time has proven these words mis-
leading. In keeping with the spirit of the amendment, to insure that all
citizens may enjoy identical rights under law (law as effected by the
sovereign aspect of each state, albeit tripartite), the courts have been
prone to find a variety of activities satisfying the requisite "state action."
Individuals, private corporations, and private clubs have been found to
act by, for or as the state, and, therefore, subject to the fourteenth amend-
8 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (distinguishing, yet noting the
parallel protections of, the fourteenth and fifth amendments with regard to racial
classifications). See note 9 infra.
9 The fourteenth amendment concerns only state action and does not apply to
federal activity. However, the fifth amendments due process clause is held to pro-
hibit similarly unjustifiable discrimination practiced by the federal government.
Boiling v. Sharpe, note 8 supra; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944); Hirabayashi Y. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). "In view of our
decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segre-
gated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government." Bolling v. Sharpe, supra at 500.
Since the civil rights concern here is primarily a state action problem the equal
protection clause will be the device in terms of which the problem will be resolved,
though the resolution applies as well to the federal action situation.
10 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (per Chief Justice
Stone).
11 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (per Chief Justice Warren) (a
fifth amendment case). For a comprehensive and timely discussion of the question,
see BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSoN, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW (1957), suggesting the
thesis that racial classifications are unconstitutional per se, and, at 209, that: "The
'separate but equal' doctrine has finally become a constitutional nullity."
12 The fourteenth amendment provides, in part:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
(Emphasis added.) U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
12 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The Court struck down a national law forbidding
racial discrimination by individuals in places of public accommodation on the ground
that neither the 'thirteenth nor fourteenth amendments provided Congress with
authority to pass such a law, and that this problem was more properly within the
domain of the several states.
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ment.14 Current judicial tenor appears to favor extending the concept of
"state action," centripetally concerning itself with the priority of personal
rights. It seems that the limits of this doctrine remain to be drawn. It is
clear, though, that the strength of the equal protection clause from the
point of view of the Negro tenant will depend not on what he does or who
he is but upon the nature of the person or persons discriminating against
him. The fourteenth amendment inhibits certain action; it looks to the
actor. The act in question must be found to satisfy the notion of "state
action" before the amendment may apply. In terms of a mathematical
proportion: as the landlord is public (acting by, for or as the state) the
fourteenth amendment is applicable, and, conversely, as the landlord is
private, the fourteenth amendment does not apply.
B. Public Landlords
The federal courts were first presented with the problem of whether to
enjoin racial discrimination by a public landlord in Favors v. Randall.15
The landlord was the Philadelphia Housing Authority, one of many such
corporations created by the various states to construct and manage low-
rent housing projects in cooperation with the United States Housing Act
of 1937.16 The Act provided for granting various subsidies to local hous-
ing authorities to effect slum clearance and provide for redevelopment
housing in those areas. 17 Pursuant to its statutory authority as the sole
administrating body, and in response to a reasonably determined practical
need, the Philadelphia Housing Authority adopted the policy of quasi-
segregation in the placing of its tenants to harmonize with the existing
"neighborhood [racial] pattern." The district court decided that the Hous-
14 See, e.g., Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879) (an individual, a judge);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (a company-owned town); Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944) (a voluntary association, the Texas Democratic
Party). See also State Action, A Study of Requirements Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 613 (1956); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for
"State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CALIF. L. REv. 208 (1957).
A candid statement of the politico-judicial nature of "state action" is made in
Comment, 45 MiCH. L. Rav. 733, 747 (1947):
"What is action by the state and where it ceases is an interesting speculation
in political philosophy. In a final sense, state action permeates society, for the
existence of anything and the action of any individual or group is permitted,
commanded or forbidden by the state: it can fairly be said that everything in
the social organism takes character from its relation to the central collective
purpose manifested by the government. But a distinction is made in the common
understanding between action by the state and the action of private persons and
it is in terms of this distinction that the Fourteenth Amendment has been held
to speak. Perhaps the only logical principle on which to found the distinction is
to attribute that action to the state which embodies a purpose of the government
or of one entrusted with its authority which is separable from the purposes of
private individuals."
15 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
16 50 STAT. 888, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-33 (1952). This act and its many amend-
ments have extensively involved the federal government in the housing industry and
in slum clearance. The most notable amendment was the Housing Act of 1949, 63
STAT. 413 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-83 (1952). For legislative history and purpose see
1949 U.S. CODE CONG. SERvicE 1550. See also Note, Discrimination Against Min-
orities in the Federal Housing Programs, 31 IND. L.J. 501 (1956).
17 50 STAT. 888, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1409-10 (1952).
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ing Authority was a state agency and that, as such, it was clearly bound
to act only within the sphere of activity permitted under the fourteenth
amendment, stating: 18
Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government . . .
takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional in-
hibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with
the State's power, his act is that of the State. Therefore, as a result of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a
state is required to extend to its citizens of the two races, white and black,
substantially equal treatment in the facilities it provides from the public
funds.
The court then proceeded to commend the doctrine of Plessy v. Fer-
gitson,19 that separate-but-equal facilities satisfy constitutional demands,
and denied the Negroes' motion for injunctive relief. On this point the
holding was in line with the then current judicial style;20 a more prescient
view could not have been expected.
21
A 1949 New Jersey decision, however, disapproved of the separate-but-
equal standard. In Seawell v. Mac Whithey22 the court enjoined racial
segregation in four housing projects in the City of East Orange. To reach
this result the court viewed the discriminatory acts as having been per-
formed by a municipal corporation, the City of East Orange, and by
public officals acting pursuant to the state enabling act and performing a
necessary public function; thereupon, the court employed the "state
action" concept as expressed in Virginia v. Rives:
23
It is doubtless true that a State may act through different agencies-either
by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities; and the prohibitions
of the [fourteenth] amendment extend to all action of the State denying
equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one of these agencies
or by another.
and as expressed in Shelley v. Kraemer:2 4
In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883), this Court pointed
out that the [Fourteenth] Amendment makes void "state action of every
kind" which is inconsistent with the guaranties therein contained, and
extends to manifestations of "State authority in the shape of laws, customs,
or judicial or executive proceedings."
The court outspokenly declared that segregation (separate-but-equal)
through state action violates the fourteenth amendment as well as the
state's public policy.2 5 Subsequent cases have almost uniformly reached
18 Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941) at 747, quoting from Ex
Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879).
19 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20 See Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940). See also Denard v. Housing Authority, 203 Ark. 1050, 159 S.W.2d 764 (1942).
21 Plessy v. Ferguson was still good law, not to be Supreme Court-destroyed
until 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education. But see Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed.
181 (S.D. Cal. 1892) (restrictive covenant).
22 2 N.J. Super. 116, 63 A.2d 542 (1949), modified on appeal on the question of
sufficiency of evidence, 2 N.J. 563, 67 A.2d 309 (1949).
23 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
2-4 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
25 New Jersey had twice previously held that distinctions based on color were
unconstitutional. Bullock v. Wooding, 123 NJ.L. 176, 8 A.2d 273 (1939) (public
beaches); Patterson v. Board of Educ., 11 N.J. Misc. 179, 164 At. 892, aff'd 112
NJ.L. 99, 169 AtI. 690 (1934) (public high school's swimming pool).
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the same result.2 6 The leading case is Banks v. Housing Authority,27
decided solely on the basis of the equal protection clause of the Con-
stitution.
The rationale behind this rule is simply that the "landlord," being a
government-inspired, state-created Housing Authority, acts as the state
in contemplation of law, not only satisfying traditional agency require-
ments but also the notion of public function or purpose. State action is
manifest. 2
8
C. Is A Private Landlord Public?
Has the prospective tenant any recourse against a private landlord who
discriminates against him because of color? Do the fourteenth amendment
protectives apply to this relationship? Or, in the adopted phraesology, may
circumstances exist which would persuade the court to view a private
landlord as public?
The relationship of landlord and tenant before Shelley v. Kraemer2 9
was treated as being governed solely by contract law. A private owner
26 Detroit Housing Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955); Davis v.
Housing Authority, Civil No. 8637, E.D. Mo., 1955; Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan
Housing Authority, 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Woodbridge v. Evansville
Housing Authority, Civil No. 618, S.D. Ind., 1953; Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J.
Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (1954); Banks v. Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App. 2d
1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953); Kankakee County Housing Authority v. Spurlock, 3 Ill.
2d 277, 120 N.E.2d 561 (1954) (by implication). Contra, only on question of
separate-but-equal, Heyward v. Public Housing Adm'n, 135 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.
Ga. 1955) (rendered dictum by final disposition of the case in 154 F. Supp. 589
(S.D. Ga. 1957) dismissing the suit. The merits should never have been reached.
214 F.2d 222, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1954)); West v. Housing Authority, 211 Ga. 133, 84
S.E.2d 30 (1954) (dictum); Miers v. Housing Authority, 266 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954) (dictum) (further proceedings were on matters here irrelevant).
It may be noted that the difference in approach gleaned from the aforementioned
cases bears strong resemblance to geographical differences. Will this practice persist
even in the federal courts?
27 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954).
The California court expressly rejected the rationale of Favors v. Randall, 40 F.
Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941), remarking at 678 that:
"Although the opinion indicates the court recognized the basic requirement of
equality of treatment it does not clearly indicate that the court's attention was
pointedly directed to the fact that the rights of 'persons', not groups, were in-
volved under the 14th Amendment. The rationale of the decision seems to be
that upon the basis of the facts before it the court felt that the questioned
method of selection would work out equitably between the two groups, white and
colored; indeed, that the colored group would obtain more housing units than
its proportionate needs called for. That, as we have seen, is not the kind of
'equal' treatment which the 14th Amendment requires."
Banks decided that the only permissible criterion for tenant selection by a public
landlord must be based upon a equality of right, viewing the rights as identical
for all citizens. The criteria of "neighborhood racial pattern" and "proportionate
racial needs" if employed would merely perpetuate the existent inequality. Id. at 678.
The practical effect of those criteria is equivalent to or approaches constitutionally
obnoxious racial zoning. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); City of Bir-
mingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 940 (1951).
See also Note, 31 IND. L.J. 501 (1956).
28 The public landlord situation as presented in the aforementioned cases does
not substantially challenge traditional "state action" notions. The relationship between
the state and the ultimate act of discrimination is not particularly subtle. Sub-
sequent situations, however will demand more careful attention.
29 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See note 7 supra.
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could dispose of his property as he saw fit in the absence of counter-
vailing constitutional or statutory requirements. 30 But, that latter quali-
fication provides the rub. As pointed out in Shelley: "[I]t would appear
beyond question that the power of the State to create and enforce pro-
perty interests must be exercised within the boundaries defined by the
Fourteenth Amendment." 3 ' This commitment led to the Court in that
case to declare state enforcement of private racially-restrictive coven-
ants unconstitutional. The implications of such language transcend tradi-
tional contract and property law ideas. But, the extent to which a private
contract becomes public and invites constitutional scrutiny is not spelled
out by the Court; it remains an open question. 32
One year after Shelley the New York Court of Appeals decided
Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.33 Faced with the implications of
Shelley the court nevertheless held that the fourteenth amendment did
not apply to the practice of racial discrimination by the landlord, Stuy-
vesant Town Corporation, concluding that there was no "state action."
Even though Stuyvesant had enjoyed the benefits of eminent domain
condemnation, a tax exemption that would amount to millions of
dollars, and was acting under a supervisory contract with New York
City, the court held that the landlord had the privilege of excluding
Negroes from consideration as tenants in its housing project. Stuyvesant
Town Corporation, a private corporation organized under the Redevelop-
ment Companies Law of New York,34 was found to be a private landlord
despite a vigorous dissent which pointed both to the fact of state initiation
of the project and to the intimate cooperation between Stuyvesant and
New York City with the attendant control and regulation exercised. The
effect of such activity, the dissent charged, was that the City had accomp-
lished indirectly what it could not have done directly-racial zoning. 35
The majority in Dorsey found that the public purpose (which they
seem to equate with "state action") had been completed when the land
was reclaimed and the apartments constructed. Action from that point
on was deemed private despite continuing obligations under the contract
with the City. The court's only defense for such a position consisted in
30 See Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 466 (1949).
3t 334 U.S. at 22.
32 See Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
213 (1956).
Apropos in this regard is a statement made by Chroust, Law And The Adminis-
trative Process: An Epistemological Approach to Jurisprudence, 58 HARv. L. REv.
573, 581 (1945):
"Any contract between two parties ... is in its ultimate significance but an act
of specification of the unity of the administration of human conduct. As a law-
making act and, therefore, an administrative act, this contract is actually an act
of public law."
This Note will not investigate the probabilities involved in trying to determine
whether Shelley opened the lid of Pandora's box as far as the presence of "state
action" in judicial proceedings is concerned. Legal commentators disagree as to the
limits which will be injected into the doctrine of Shelley, but do seem to agree that
there is need for some kind of limitation. See, e.g., Shanks, supra; Huber, Revolution
iz Private Law?, 6 S.C.L.Q. 8 (1953).
33 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
34 N.Y. UNcONsOL. LAWS § 3401 (McKinney 1949).
35 Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917); City of Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 940 (1951).
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its reading of the Redevelopment Companies Act.3 6 That this is to dis-
regard the obvious realities of the situation was the charge leveled by the
dissenters. 37 Their spokesman, Judge Fuld, protested that the entire
Stuyvesant undertaking was clearly "state action" because it was un-
mistakably a government-conceived, government-aided, and government-
regulated project in urban redevelopment.
The Dorsey case becomes more understandable and plausible, at least
as a decision of the New York Court of Appeals, when one reflects upon
the prevailing jurisprudential commitments of New York courts. Partic-
ularly instructive are the cases of Kemp v. Rubin3 s and Pratt v. La-
Guardia.3 9 The latter case also dealt with the Stuyvesant Town project.
An equitable action going to the supervisory contract between New York
City and Stuyvesant was brought by Pratt, a taxpayer of the City, against
the mayor and others to permanently enjoin the informally proposed
policy of Stuyvesant Town to racially discriminate. The action was dis-
missed as being premature. The court said that not until the commission
of some act which is then claimed to be repugnant to the fourteenth
amendment would the court listen to the case.40 The opinion strongly
suggests that the New York judiciary will not concern itself with policy-
making requests, no matter how great their intrinsic appeal. Similarly, a
year before Shelley the court saw fit in Kemp to enforce a racially re-
strictive covenant, stating that it was:
. . . constrained to follow precedent and govern itself in accordance with
what it considers to be the prevailing law .... 41
It seems clear ... that we do not have on our statute books any specific
provision which outlaws racial restrictive covenants. In the circumstances,
this court does not feel that it should judicially legislate by reading into the
statutes something which the Legislature itself has failed to adopt. (Emphasis
added.)42
36 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950). The Redevelopment Companies Law, N.Y.
UNCONSOL. § 3401 (McKinney 1942), was upheld as a proper police power exercise
in Murray v. La Guardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1942), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 771 (1943). Commenting on Dorsey's interpretation of that Law, it is said in
Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 YALE L.J. 426, 440, n.66 (1948):
"The opinion construed the purpose of the statute in a narrow physical sense.
In holding that the statutory purpose was accomplished at the moment
the buildings were constructed, the court ignored the broad implications of
'neighborhood rehabilitation' required by the act. That the objective was to
clear slums and provide for the housing needs of lower middle-class income
groups is manifest in the continuing controls which the city maintains over the
project."
37 Fuld, J., Loughran, C. J., and Desmond, J., dissented. Lewis, Conway and
Dye, J.J., concurred with Bromley, J., who wrote the opinion of the court. The
desires of the dissenters were vindicated by the New York Legislature when it
passed Article 2-A of the Civil Rights Law, "Equal Rights to Publicly-Aided
Housing." See note 47, infra.
38 188 Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1947), rev'd, 298 N.Y. 590, 81 N.E.2d 325
(1948). Merits were reversed on the authority of Shelley v. Kraemer. This reversal is
not, however, inconsistent with the jurisprudential posture of the New York courts
discussed in the text.
39 182 Misc. 462, 47 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1944), affd without opinion, 268 App. Div.
973, 52 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1944), leave to appeal denied, 294 N.Y. 842, 62 N.E.2d
394 (1945).
40 Id., 47 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
41 69 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
42 Id. at 685. See note 38 supra.
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The court did recognize their prerogative of liberal construction but were
quick to reiterate a venerable expression of Cardozo: "[F]reedom to
construe is not freedom to amend."
43
Jurisprudentially, then, the New York courts see themselves, at least
in this area, as strict interpreters of the law-as written or as dictated by
judicial precedent. Moreover, they understand the civil right amendment
of the State Constitutional Convention of 1938 to be merely permissive
in character requiring further legislative implementation to create any new
rights.44 Litigants with novel "civil rights" claims are referred to the
legislature. It is submitted Dorsey quite clearly reflects this judicial ap-
proach. Globerman v. Grand Central Parkway Gardens,45 following
Dorsey, reinforced this commitment, observing, inter alia:4 6
Until such time as the Legislature shall have adopted a law which shall
declare that the opportunity to purchase and to lease real property without
discrimination shall constitute a civil right, claims of the nature asserted in
this action are not actionable.
Thus, it seems that as far as the New York courts were concerned the
Dorsey situation posed merely a fact-determining problem. The juris-
prudential tenor was clear; the complaining Negroes had to overcome a
formidable inertia. This they failed to accomplish.
Whether the holding in Dorsey commends itself, and regardless of the
fact that the New York Legislature soon foreclosed the possibility of such
a holding in the future,47 the New York courts' approach to the problem
remains significant, and poses three propositions. First, faced with the
problem of private versus public landlord, a particular court may be
expected to bottom its judgment on its established jurisprudential com-
mitments concerning the Constitution. These may be gleaned beforehand
and will likely include the court's predispositions regarding the respective
weights in balancing property rights against personal civil rights and the
43 Quoted in Kemp, 69 N.Y.S.2d at 685; Cardozo, J., was speaking for the court
in Sexauer & Lemke v. Luke A. Burke & Sons Co., 228 N.Y. 341, 127 N.E. 329, 331
(1920).
44 Kemp v. Rubin, 69 N.Y.S.2d at 684-85. Reference is to Section 11, Article 1,
of the Constitution of the State of New York:
"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion,
be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by
any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision
of the state."
45 115 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1952). The case involved the landlord-
tenant contract relationship, the assertion having been made that the landlord had a
legal obligation to renew or extend the lease of a present tenant without discrimin-
ation. Although the case did not involve racial discrimination the court relied upon
the Dorsey holding, in part, and said at 760: "The landlords have the absolute right,
under law, to choose their tenants. They possess this right, not only with respect to
original tenancies, but also with respect to any renewals or extensions thereof."
See Alsberg v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 46 Misc. 617, 92 N.Y.S. 851 (1905) (concerning
the rights of an apartment hotel owner).
46 Globerman v. Grand Central Parkway Gardens, 115 N.Y.S.2d 757, 761 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Co. 1952).
47 N.Y. Civil- Rights Law § 18 (Supp. 1957) (including landlords such as
Stuyvesant within the "publicly-assisted" classification). See note 70 infra.
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court's inclinations regarding judicial legislation. Secondly, outstanding
among the factors which will help determine the constitutional nature of
the landlord will be the essential moving force and purpose behind his
existence, 48 and the presence or lack of governmental regulation. Thirdly,
we can expect continued unanimity in the recognition that a private land-
lord has the privilege of discriminating indiscriminately.
Recognizing in Dorsey, which presented a landlord who on the facts
was more public than most, the apparent unwillingness of the New York
courts to follow the spirit of Shelley, are there, nevertheless, theories upon
which courts of other jurisdictions might seize if they desire to give the
particular Negro relief? Ming v. Horgan,49 now before a California court,
may provide an answer to this question. A "middle-ground" is involved.
Ming squarely poses the question of whether a landlord who is financed
under existing FHA50 underwriting procedures is a public landlord. 5t
The Negro plaintiffs' argument admits that private landlords may dis-
criminate as they please but it urges that the factor of FHA assistance or
FHA participation transforms the builder-landlords into quasi-administra-
tive "arms" of government. If that is so, plaintiffs argue, the Constitution
imposes a duty upon them not to discriminate. They conceive of the
statutory scheme, its purpose and its ultimate financial assistance, as hav-
ing the effect of a conduit rendering the acts of the builders (as dis-
criminating sellers) "governmental action." 52
48 This characterization is intended to provoke thought as to the way in which
the courts are searching for an answer to "state action" when an individual or
corporation is in fact the actor but when the act has either been suggested by, made
possible by, or been assisted by the state.
49 No. 97,130, Dept. 6, Super. Ct. Calif., Sacramento County, 1958. At the time
of this writing a decision in the case has not been reached.
50 "FHA" will be employed in this Note to indicate the Federal Housing
Authority.
51 This issue has never been adequately raised in court. However, in Johnson v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 131 F. Supp 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955) a similar fact situation was
involved. The plaintiffs sued in federal court against the FHA and VA (Veterans
Administration) as federal agencies and against the Levitt corporation. The suit
against the government was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The court said at 116:
"[The extensive involvement of the government in the construction of a housing
community like Levittown does] not, however, in my opinion, result in making
Levitt and Sons, Inc., of New York, the government of the United States or a
branch or agency of it nor [does it] make the government of the United States
the builder or developer of the Levittown project .... Neither the FHA nor
the VA has been charged by Congress with the duty of preventing discrimination
in the sales of housing properties. What the plaintiffs are saying in effect is that
these agencies ought to be charged with that duty. But that is something which
can be done only by Congress and which cannot be forced upon the agencies
in question by the courts through the injunctive process."
The suit as against Levitt also failed, but because the complaint did not allege
that the discrimination was being accomplished under color of any state authority,
a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction under the civil rights laws, REv. STAT. 1977-79
(1875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1952) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1952).
Two cases have been found which hold by implication that an FHA landlord is
private, Globerman v. Grand Central Parkway Gardens, 115 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Co., 1952), and Novick v. Levitt & Sons, 108 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co.
1951), aff'd without opinion, 279 App. Div. 658, 107 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (2d Dept. 1951),
although the precise issue of public versus private was not in question.
52 These arguments have been gleaned from the Brief for Plaintiff.
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The National Housing Act of 1949 embodies the congressional declara-
tion of our national housing policy: 53
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the
Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing
production and related community development sufficient to remedy the
serious housing shortage, the elimination of substandard and other inade-
quate housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the
realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable
living environment for every American family, thus contributing to the
development and redevelopment of communities and to the advancement of
the growth, wealth, and security of the Nation.
Pursuant to this policy Congress ordained to encourage private builders
to create more houses by making financing procedures more attractive
with FHA loan guaranties. This method is indirect and may be contrasted
with the direct subsidies granted in the case of low-rent public housing
projects. But the plaintiffs in Ming see this relationship as one which
would justify the labelling of the builder who chooses to take advantage
of this government help as a constructive trustee. This presents what
they call the fundamental issue of the case: 5 4
May the operative builders who produce the needed housing as envisioned
by, and which is the objective of, the National Housing Act and who avail
themselves of the facilities of the Federal Housing Authority in the pro-
duction of that housing, discriminate against intended Congressional bene-
ficiaries solely on the basis of race...?
It may be said that in large measure Congress has provided the
builder with a large tract of land containing many new houses. Is the
public purpose complete at this point, before he then, as home owner,
offers them for sale to prospective buyers?s5 Or, does the Act envision the
sale as well? The spirit of the National Housing Act is surely that encom-
passing; although Congress did not spell out standards to govern sales, it
must have viewed subsequent sales as an essential part of its overall plan.
53 63 STAT. 413, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1952).
54 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 49, Ming v. Horgan.
65 CI. Dorsey v Stuyvesant Town Corp. See text at 469. But see Brief for Plain-
tiff, pp. 27, 28, Ming v. Horgan, commenting that such a contention is untenable:
"This Alice-In-Wonderland claim of the right to impose racial discrimination
in the selection of purchasers is predicated on the fact that each of the houses
will be sold by the builder in his private capacity to an individual who will
execute an individual mortgage with the house and land as security to a private
lending institution. All that has gone before-the cooperation between govern-
ment and builder in planning the development, the rigorous requirements im-
posed by government as a precondition of the prior commitment without which
not a single house would have been produced, the lending institution's agree-
ment to make the mortgage loan, conditioned as it was on the certain knowl-
edge that it could minimize its risk through the mortgage insurance program,
the close cooperation between builder and government conforming the houses
to standards set by government, the conformity of the subdivision to the over-
all county or city planning required by government, the proviso that FHA must
approve the ultimate buyer, the requirements as to down payments and interest
rates to be assessed against the buyer-mortgagor-all these are brushed aside as
matters of no consequence. All that will come after-the fact that government
credit stands behind the mortgage insurance, the requirement against sale on less
favorable credit terms, the pledge of government to process complaints of
faulty construction for a year after sale or initial occupancy-all these are
relegated into- the unimportant. The blind man has seized the elephant's tail
and is telling us that the animal resembles a rope."
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Perhaps a comparison is apt between the FHA landlord and the public
landlord discussed previously. Both are congressionally inspired; each
landlord became such because of the National Housing Act. Each land-
lord receives assistance from the federal government. There is one signifi-
cant difference, however. Low-rent public housing projects are adminis-
tered by state-created agencies provided for by the federal Act, while the
administration of the FHA home building program is accomplished
essentially by the home builder-owner himself. The comparable "tenant
selection" is being done on the one hand by a state agency and on the
other by the "agency" of the builder-owner himself and his real estate
broker. It is contended that this latter "agency" must be, in contemplation
of law, a quasi-administrative "arm" of government since Congress has
given the FHA landlord financial support and other benefits-necessarily
including a power to select tenants for his project. To hold otherwise,
allowing FHA landlords to discriminate, would be to indirectly sanction
the government's channelling of power and financial support into private
hands "to rob Constitutional guarantees of all vitality."56 An analogy is
suggested to the power lodged in labor unions because of federal legisla-
tion, the point being that this power is more than it would have been
absent government legislation. The Supreme Court has considered the
consequences of this envestment of power in labor unions, having cau-
tioned, in American Communications Association v. Douds:57
But power is never without responsibility. And when authority derives in
part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by
56 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 30, Ming v. Horgan. Cf. Note, Constitutional Restrictions
on a Lessee of Public Property, 42 VA. L. REv. 647 (1956). The situation considered
therein is where a municipality, for example, rents an auditorium to a private
organization which in turn conducts a function ordinarily open to the public but
which is racially restricted by that organization, not by the municipality. It may be
said that the town provided the group with the means to frustrate the Constitution,
or, on the other hand, that this is mere private discrimination. The author there re-
commends the test of good faith-whether the municipality acted or is acting in good
faith with respect to its public and constitutional obligations. Compare Derrington v.
Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957), with
Madden v. Queens Jockey Club, 269 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697 (1947).
57 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950). The Court continued by clarifying, at 402:
"We do not suggest that labor unions which utilize the facilities of the
National Labor Relations Board become Government agencies or may be re-
gulated as such. But it is plain that when Congress clothes the bargaining re-
presentative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body
both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents,' [quoted from
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944)] the public interest
in the good faith exercise of that power is very great." (Emphasis added.)
Query, what does the public interest dictate regarding non-discriminatory tenant
selection?
Note also the comments made by Mr. Justice Jackson in The Supreme Court in
the American System of Government, The Godkin Lectures at Harvard University,
1955, at 69:
"It is my basic view that whenever any organization or combination of in-
dividuals, whether in a corporation, a labor union or other body, obtains such
economic or legal advantage that it can control or in effect govern the lives of
other people, it is subject to the control of the Government, be it state or
federal, for the Government can suffer no rivals in the field of coercion. Liberty
requires that coercion be applied to the individual not by other individuals but
by the Government after full inquiry into the justification."
Is the FHA landlord in such a position, and if so, will the fact that the Govern-
ment helped to put him there persuade a court to find public action?
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private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by
Government itself.
This postulate may well be adopted by the judiciary as the link between
FHA housing and public housing, rendering the major differences between
them constitutionally irrelevant. To do this would be to say that even
though an FHA landlord when selecting his tenants is not a govern-
mental agency, the relationship of the FHA landlord to his tenants may
be equated with the relationship of the public housing authority to its
tenants-through the envestment of power idea. That is, that the power
he exercises is to be exercised within the same limits as governmental
action because his "authority derives in part from Government's thumb
on the scales."58 The results, then, reached in Banks v. Housing Author-
ity59 could be applied; and in the Ming case the "rights" of the plaintiffs
would be vindicated.
The situation presented by an FHA landlord also suggests two other
theories which commend themselves. The theories are prompted by the
Supreme Court cases of Smith v. Allwright6o and Marsh v. Alabama.6 1
In Smith the Court found "state action" and was able to apply the fif-
teenth amendment to prohibit racial discrimination by a voluntary associ-
ation of individuals which technically had no legal connection with the
state. The right of Negroes to vote was being circumvented by the
Democratic Party of Texas which had adopted the prerequisite of "white"
citizenship to be able to vote in primary elections. Observing that Texas
law had "entrusted" the Party "with the determination of the qualifications
of participants in the primary," the Court declared that this is state action,
and remarked:6 2
The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants
to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials without
restriction by any State because of race. This grant to the people of the
opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a State through casting its
electoral process in a form which permits a private organization to practice
racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights would be of little
value if they could be thus indirectly denied.
The foundation of the democratic political structure was clearly in jeop-
ardy, the elective process, cast as it must be as a responsibility of the state.
State action will be found when such an essential state function is in-
volved and racial discrimination is being practiced, despite the fact that
58 See Brief for Plaintiff, p. 48, Ming v. Horgan:
"We do not suppose that even the builder-defendants in this case or their
selling agents, the real estate brokers, will contend that government's thumb
was not laid heavily on the scales in the operative builder-defendants' pro-
duction of housing for the mass market in Sacramento county. We do not
suppose that even they will contend that the purposes of the National Housing
Act did not comprehend plaintiff and the class he represents equally with his
white counterparts."
59 120 Cal. App. 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954).
See text at p. 468, supra.
60 321 U.S. 649 (1944). This cage arose under the fifteenth amendment which
forbids "state" action denying or abridging the right of a citizen to vote on account
of race or color.
01 326 U.S. 501 (1946).




"formal state action, either by way of legislative recognition or official
authorization, is wholly wanting." 63
The practice of using the Constitution to insure that functions which are
properly state functions are not prostituted by private activity ultimately
infringing upon personal civil rights in reinforced by the holding in
Marsh v. Alabama.64 There, a private corporation owned the "company
town" of Chickasaw, Alabama, where a Jehovah's Witness undertook to
exercise her freedom of speech and religion by passing out religious
literature. She was arrested for trespass pursuant to an Alabama statute
and was convicted. The conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court
which held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to her-in
effect holding that the operation of a company town amounts con-
stitutionally to the operation of a municipality, an "arm" of the state,
which must respect personal civil rights. The Court said, inter alia:
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statu-
tory and constitutional rights of those who use it.65
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against
those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here,
we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.66
(Emphasis added.)
These propositions, then, present themselves to the California court
deciding the Ming case and to any state court having to decide the con-
stitutional nature of an FHA landlord. The court will first have to
determine whether Shelley applies, forbidding court sanction of the dis-
crimination. Whether Shelley, which was a state case concerned solely
with state action, would forbid finding an FHA landlord private, and
thereby permitting discrimination, has to be answered. Marsh may in-
troduce the seductive device of balancing rights when civil and property
interests collide, and it may point toward a resolution of the issue by its
comments regarding property being used so as to suggest availability to
the public. Douds and Smith may convince the court that since the
Government has seen fit to stimulate the housing industry and put its
"thumb on the scales," the resultant housing should be deemed to have
been constructed pursuant to a public function creating a duty in the
landlords to assure the intended beneficiaries equal benefits. Then, too,
Dorsey will suggest that the actors are but private builders and real estate
agents, and that Congress has seen fit not to condition FHA assistance
or to impose any duty on those who are assisted. And, the sidestep of
telling a plaintiff that the court is not the proper forum for legislating is
a strong temptation. 67
63 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 471 (1953) (the "'Jaybird Primary" case).
64 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
65 Id. at 506.
66 Id. at 509. Here, again, it is clear that oftentimes property rights do conflict
with civil rights. The Supreme Court expressly advocates considering this clash as a
clash, and suggests balancing the opposing interests, preference always being accorded
civil rights. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 510-11. This directive of the
Supreme Court was expressly rejected by the New York Court of Appeals in Dorsey
v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541, 550 (1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 981 (1950). Query?
67 The holding of Dorsey serves at least as a reminder of the bold position that
state courts might take in order to favor projects the size of Stuyvesant Town or
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Anti-Discrimination Housing Laws - Their Constitutionality
Introduction
To provide a remedy for prospective tenants who are discriminated
against because of color or creed in their quest for housing accommoda-
tions and, perhaps more importantly, to take positive steps toward
alleviating the infectious slum situation, the legislative organs of a number
of cities and states have enacted anti-discrimination housing laws. 68 The
to point the way toward establishing a loophole in the expanding "state action"
doctrine and the consequent subordination of states' rights. The state courts' fear
of the implications of Smith, Marsh and Shelley is clear. They retaliate by observing
that the state sovereign in its form as the legislature should make the appropriate
remarks on all civil rights issues, and until they so do claimants will generally be
without remedy. The extent to which the Supreme Court will permit this assertion,
the extent to which the state legislatures will cooperate with their courts by con-
tinued silence, and the extent to which men will care to and dare to impose social
and moral order upon themselves through legislation remain to be seen.
Another line of judicial thought suggests itself as a possible counteracting force
for the expanding "state action" momentum, and that is the notion that a voluntary
association acts "privately" and may discriminate with impunity. See Goshorn v.
Bar Ass'n of District of Columbia, 152 F. Supp. 300 (D.C. 1957) (bar association);
Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 505, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957) (trade union); cf. State v.
Clyburn, 101 S.E.2d 295 (N.C. 1958) (restaurant proprietor may segregate his
patrons); Madden v. Queens Jockey Club, 269 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697 (1947)
(state licensee, a race track, can, without reason or excuse, exclude a person from
attending its races). But cf. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957) (county court house lessee, a cafeteria, can not
discriminate against patrons on account of race). See also Letter from Alfred Avins
and Edward Mainardi, Instructor and student at Rutgers School of Law, to the
Notre Dame Lawyer, Dec. 6, 1957, on file in Notre Dame Law Library. It seems
that, although the rule that private associations may act "privately" necessarily has
a place in our jurisprudence-in light of the rights to private property and to peace-
ably assemble-the ideas expressed in Marsh v. Alabama, Smith v. Allwright and
Shelley v. Kraemer recognize that conflicts with the guaranties of the fourteenth
amendment will arise, and that a proper balancing of rights will not allow personal
civil rights to be subverted.
68 The statutes, ordinances and housing authority resolutions are collected in a
publication of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Nondiscrimination Clauses
in Regard to Public Housing, Private Housing and Urban Redevelopment Under-
takings, Oct. 1957.
Canada has also had some experience in this field. A 1954 Fair Accommodations
Practices Act was passed for the province of Ontario, 3 Eliz. 2, c. 28, § 2 (1954)
(Canada):
"No person shall deny to any person or class of persons the accommodation,
services or facilities available in any place to which the public is customarily
admitted because of the race, creed, color, nationality, ancestry or place of origin
of such person or class of persons."
See Matter of Shields, noted in 1 RAcE REL. L. Rta'. 1145 (1956), disposing of a
complaint brought under that law finding that a private apartment owner is not
covered by the Act.
The Ontario law corresponds r6ughly to the American statutes which 'prohibit
racial and religious discrimination in places of "public accommodation." Twenty
states, the District of Columbia and three territories have such statutes. Their con-
stitutionality has been upheld a number of times. See e.g., District of Columbia v.
John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953); People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 18
N.E. 245 (1888). See COMMISSION ON LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION, AMERICAN JEwIsH
CONGRESS, MEMsORANDUM ON CONSTrrUTIONALrY OF MErcALF-BAKER FAIR HousING
PRcrcEs BILL 7, 8 (1957).
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laws are similar in that they proscribe all racial and religious discrimin-
ation but there are significant differences in the types of landlords they
affect. Public housing authorities and urban redevelopment companies are
subject to these laws in at least twenty-six cities in thirteen states.6 9
Publicly-assisted landlords70 are covered by the statutes of Massachu-
setts, 71 New Jersey, 72 New York,73 Oregon, 74 and Washington. 75 The
most fargoing, however, is the recent New York City Law76 which applies
to all landlords save those who rent apartments in apartment houses of
less than three units or sell homes in a development of less than ten con-
tiguous homes. The coverage of this law is broad indeed, affecting an
estimated 1,700,000 apartments in that city.
7 7
69 Ibid. See also 18 LAW. GUILD REV. 23, 25 (1958) where it is pointed out that
the passage of this New York City law has spurred drives to enact similar legislation
in other cities and states. However, not mentioned in the article is Chicago, where
Alderman Despres and Holman are preparing a similar bill. See letters from Leon
M. Despres and Claude W. B. Holman, Chicago Aldermen, to the Notre Dame
Lawyer, Jan. 14, 1958, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
70 The definition of "publicly-assisted" varies somewhat in these laws. New
York State has been a pioneer in this legislation and its ExEcuTIvE LAW § 292 (11)
now reads:
"The term 'publicly-assisted housing accommodations' shall include all housing
accommodations within the state of New York in
(a) public housing,
(b) housing operated by housing companies under the supervision of the com-
missioner of housing,
(c) housing ...
(1) which is exempt in whole or in part from taxes levied by the state or
any of its political subdivisions,
(2) which is constructed on land sold below cost by the state or any of its
political subdivisions or any agency thereof, pursuant to the federal
housing act of nineteen hundred forty-nine,
(3) which is constructed in whole or in part on property acquired or as-
sembled by the state or any of its political subdivisions or any agency
thereof through the power of condemnation or otherwise for the pur-
pose of such construction, or
(4) for the acquisition, construction, repair or maintenance of which the
state or any of its political subdivisions or any agency thereof supplies
funds or other financial assistance,
(d) housing which is located in a multiple [at least a three-family] dwelling,
the acquisition, construction, rehabilitation, repair or maintenance of
which is . . . financed in whole or in part by a loan, whether or not
secured by a mortgage, the repayment of which is guaranteed or insured
by the federal government or any agency thereof, or the state or any of
its political subdivisions or any agency thereof, provided that such a
housing accommodation shall be deemed to be publicly assisted only
during the life of such loan and such guaranty or insurance; and
(e) housing which is offered for sale by a person who owns or otherwise
controls the sale of ten or more housing accommodations located on
land that is contiguous (exclusive of public streets), if [the acquisition,
construction, rehabilitation, repair or maintenance of such housing ac-
commodations is financed as in paragraph (d), supra.]"
71 MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 151 B, § I (Supp. 1957).
72 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-25-4, 5 (Supp. 1957).
73 N.Y. ExEcUrIvE LAW §§ 290-98 (Supp. 1957); N.Y. CIvIL RIGHTS LAw § 18
(Supp. 1957).
74 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 659.032-34 (1957).
75 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60 (1957).
76 Admin. Code of New York City, c. 41, § X41-1.0 (1957).
77 See Letter from John J. O'Neill, Administrative Assistant to the President of
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Recognizing the touchy personal problems that will likely arise as a
result of these "anti-discrimination" or "open-occupancy" housing laws,
the legislatures have designed the enforcement provisions to utilize the
conciliatory technique, which has proven very successful in the adminis-
trative process. 78 Hence an administrative agency is created, where an
aggrieved person may bring a complaint. The agency will conduct an
investigation and attempt through conciliation to eliminate any existing
practice of discrimination. If this method fails, a procedure is established
for determining whether court action is warranted. For example, the New
York City Law provides that the City Commission on Intergroup Re-
lations will first deal with the problem. If necessary, the matter will then
be referred to a board selected from a panel appointed by the mayor to
decide whether the case need be brought to court. If so, the case will be
referred to the city's corporation counsel to bring suit to enforce the
law.7 9
the City Council of New York, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Apr. 30, 1958, on file
in Notre Dame Law Library.
Although significant anti-discrimination housing laws exist and other such
legislation is being agitated for, a distinct majority of the states have neither con-
sidered such laws nor do they indicate a need or desire to do so. See Letters to the
Notre Dame Lawyer in reply to a letter sent to the governors of the forty-eight
states on Nov. 12, 1957, inquiring about legislation in this area, on file in Notre Dame
Law Library. Positions at opposite extremes were taken in some letters. For example,
a letter from the Louisiana Legislative Council made reference to the provision in
the Louisiana Criminal Code, LA. REv. STAT. § 14:317 (1921), which provides, in
part:
"No person or the agent of any person owning or having in charge any
apartment house, tenement house, or other building in any city, which is used
for dwelling purposes, shall rent any part of any building to a negro person
or negro family...."
See Letter from Emmett Asseff, Executive Director of the Louisiana Legislative
Council, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Nov. 25, 1957, on file in Notre Dame Law
Library. The letter from North Carolina contained the remark:
"Such an approach as this, in effect using the force of state law to compel
one to have certain neighbors, does seem to go pretty far along the line toward
a 'police state.' In the final analysis, people will get along with one another if
they sincerely feel within their hearts the desire to do so. It is not likely that
any amount of legislation will compel this result."
Letter from Robert E. Giles, Administrative Assistant to the Governor of North
Carolina, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Nov. 20, 1957, on file in Notre Dame Law
Library.
Minnesota and New York, on the other hand, seem determined to go as far as
they can toward declaring broad civil rights in this area. Note the 1957 Minnesota
Law, c. 953, § 2, which provides:
"The opportunity to buy, acquire, lease, sublease, occupy and use and enjoy
property and to obtain decent living and housing accommodations without dis-
crimination because of race, color, creed, religion, national origin or ancestry
is hereby recognized and declared to be a civil right."
See also Letter from Averell Harriman, Governor of New York, to the Notre Dame
Lawyer Nov. 18, 1957, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
78 The merits of this method, particularly the conciliation technique, are dis-
cussed in Carter, Practical Considerations of Anti-Discrimination Legislation-Ex-
perience Under the New York Law Against Discrimination, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 40
(1954).
79 Admin. Code of New York City, c. 41, § X41-1.0 (c-f), (1957). The New
York state law provides for conciliation and also for a public hearing, if necessary,
to be conducted by the State Commission Against Discrimination. That Corn-
Continued on page 480
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Once in court, the landlord has an opportunity to raise constitutional
objections. Regarding the laws as they pertain to public housing author-
ities the question of their constitutionality is not apt, since these land-
lords already have the constitutional duty not to discriminate.8 0 It may
be said that the law as applied to them is, constitutionally speaking, re-
dundant, or that it states a truism. But, as the laws may impose new duties
upon redevelopment companies and publicly-assisted landlords they are
open to question as permissible exercises of state police power. Only the
constitutionality of the New York City Law will be considered in this Note
because it is felt that since it is the most extreme objections to it will
include objections to a law which is not as fargoing. To make such a
study is to examine the traditional objections to exercises of state police
power purported to be in the public interest: that the law offends due
process notions by exceeding permissible state power, that the classifica-
tions made by the law are arbitrary and unreasonable, or that the law
conflicts with federal operations in that field. 8'
A. Attacking the State's Power
The fourteenth amendment commands that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'8 2 Private
landlords arguing against constitutionality look to the due process clause
and assert that state regulation of their tenant selection deprives them of
a crucial incident of property ownership by interfering with the right to
rent, sell or otherwise dispose of it. They charge that there is no justifica-
tion for sacrificing real property rights, traditionally sacred, in an at-
mission also has power to issue cease and desist orders. Court action may then be
taken either by the Commission to enforce the order or by the landlord to appeal
the ruling. Or, in the alternative, an aggrieved may proceed directly with a civil
action. His choice of one of these remedies is preclusive with respect to the other.
Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 622, 144 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1955) (further
proceedings on matters here irrelevant).
80 See note 26 supra.
81 An ingenious argument, which pertains peculiarly to "open-occupancy" hous-
ing laws, was devised and presented to the New York Supreme Court, Westchester
County, by Alfred Avins, counsel for respondents in New York State Comm'n
Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester Co. 1958). Called the "public utility argument" (see Brief for
Respondents, pp. 25, 26, and Avins, Trade Regulations, 12 RUTGERs L. REV. 149
(1957)), it proceeds from an intial premise that the effect of the law is to convert
a large number of houses from private property into quasi-public utilities by en-
titling the public to demand accommodation without discrimination as a matter of
right. This premise is sound, he says, because before the law private houses were
private and the owner could do with them what he pleased, act indiscriminately; but
after the law the property was vulnerable to an absolute and public right to demand
service, or accommodation, the sihe qua non of a public utility. Since this conversion
is without compensation from the state, it is argued, unconstitutional interference
has transpired. Petitioner attacked the premise, i.e., that the public had been given
an absolute right, by pointing to the fact that under the law a landlord may "reject
or exclude for any reason or no reason as long as the exclusion is not founded on
race, creed, color or national origin." Reply Brief for Petitioner, p. 10, New York
State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., supra.
The "public utility argument" was apparently disregarded by the court and does
seem to be quite far-fetched.
82 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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tempt83 to cure this alleged social evil, nor for interfering with their
peculiar relationship with their tenants as if they were innkeepers who
deal primarily with transients and who have little need for ensuring
continued social tranquility. Regardless of the legalistic appeal of these
protests the answer still depends on whether the state has the power to
so govern. 84
This so-called police power is inherent in each state and is appropriately
exercised when it concerns the health, safety or welfare of those governed.
The concept, of course, is a plastic one and may be seen manifested in
myriad ways. Regarding the limits of this power the Supreme Court
stated in Nebbia v. New York:8 5
The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth,
as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the pub-
lic welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by
securing that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due
process. And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands
only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained.
This test must be applied to the anti-discrimination housing laws. But,
there are cases closer to the landlord-tenant relationship than Nebbia, for
instance, the cases passing upon government's power to control rents. The
laws were upheld in each instance. 86 However, each case turned upon
the fact that an emergency was found to exist, vindicating the extra-
ordinary police power exercise by the state. The New York Court of
83 There are sharp differences of opinion as to the true effects of laws passed
in this area, as to whether they can and will cure the evil involved. A recent news-
paper article, Grutzner, Housing Outlook Cloudy in Harlem, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23,
1958, p. R 1, col. 8, points to the current experience that New York City is having
and the failure of attempts at racial integration in Harlem. Mr. Grutzner restates
the views of various organizations including the NAACP and the Urban League.
Though these organizations look to the recent New York City Law with some
degree of hope, the fact seems to remain that there are some areas in which these
laws may do more harm than good. Query whether this situation is to be noted by
the judiciary or only by the legislators?
84 As Eager, J., 'upholding New York State's anti-discrimination housing law in
New York State Comm'n" Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments,
Inc., 170 N.Y.S.2d 750, 757 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1958), has put it:
"Involved here, it is said is an apparent collision of rights, namely, a clash
between the right on the one hand of the private owner of property to enjoy and
use it in the manner most desirable and/or profitable to him, and the right on
the other hand of all individuals here to be treated equally and free of all dis-
crimination on account of race, color, or religion. In the final analysis, however,
what is here involved is a conflict between the rights of the private property
owner and the inherent power of the state to regulate the use and enjoyment of
private property in the interest of public welfare; and ... the power of the state,
when reasonably exercised, is supreme."
85 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
86 E.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135 (1921); Lincoln Bldg. Associates v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 135 N.E.2d 801 (1956);
People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. LaFetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921).
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Appeals noted this fact recently when dealing with the 1955 re-enactment
of the New York Business Rent Law,8 7 but stated further that:88
The law is clear. The principles by which to test the constitutionality of
a statute resting on the police power have been asserted over and over
again: A legislative enactment carries with it a strong presumption of con-
stitutionality, i.e., it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the
Legislation . . . [And courts may not] substitute their judgment for that of
the Legislature so long as there can be discovered "any state of facts either
known or which could reasonably be assumed" to afford support for the
legislative decision to act.8 9
It seems quite probable that if and when the Supreme Court is faced
with testing a law as broad as that of New York City it will be inclined to
favor the law, just as it favored New York's Emergency Housing Laws90
in Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel.9 1 Note the parallel circumstances: the Em-
ergency Housing Laws were enacted on the basis of legislative findings
that a shortage of dwelling space and the consequent over-crowding were
leading to unsanitary conditions, disease, immorality, and wide-spread
discontent. 92 The selected remedy deprived landlords of their right to
87 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8551 (McKinney Supp. 1957) was upheld. Lincoln
Bldg. Associates v. Barr, supra note 86. The court was careful to note in this regard
that:
"The disposition of this appeal .. . is dependent upon the existence of facts
justifying the 1955 extension .of the law under review. In no way is it deter-
minative of the constitutionality of ... controls in any later year. Rent controls,
all-will agree, ought not achieve a status of permanence in our economy. They
have no justification except in periods of emergency. [Citing cases.] ... Whether
and for how long the Legislature may lawfully continue [such] control must,
and shall, be a question open for future review." 135 N.E.2d at 805-06.
88 Id. at 802.
89 Quoting from United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154
(1938). See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), where it is stated at
537:
"So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of
other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that
policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority
either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to over-
ride it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the require-
ments of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court junctus officio."
90 Laws of New York, cc. 942-53, 1920.
91 258 U.S. 242 (1922). See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921), where
Mr. Justice Holmes remarks: "Housing is a necessary of life. All the elements of a
public interest justifying some degree of public control are present."
92 The recent New York City Law begins with this statement:
"In the city of New York, with its great cosmopolitan population consisting of
large numbers of people of every race, color, religion, national origin and
ancestry, many persons have been compelled to live in circumscribed sections
under substandard, unhealthful, unsanitary and crowded living conditions be-
cause of discrimination and segregation in housing. These conditions have
caused increased mortality, morbidity, delinquency, risk of fire, intergroup
tension, loss of tax revenue and other evils. As a result, the peace, health, safety
and general welfare of the entire city and all its inhabitants are threatened. Such
segregation in housing also necessarily results in other forms of segregation and
discrimination which are against the policy of the state of New York. It results
in racial segregation in public schools and other public facilities, which is con-
demned by the constitutions of our state and nation. In order to guard against
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evict. After stressing the great weight to be given legislative findings, the
Court upheld the laws, noting: 93
It is strenuously argued, as it was in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 [1921],
and in the Marcus Brown Case, [256 U.S. 170 (1921)] that the relation of
landlord and tenant is a private one and is not so affected by a public in-
terest as to render it subject to regulation by the exercise of the police
power.
It is not necessary to discuss this contention at length, for so early as
1906, when the Tenement House Act of New York, enacted in 1901, was
assailed as an unconstitutional interference with the right of property in
land, on substantially all of the grounds now urged against the Emergency
Housing Laws, this court, in a per curiamn opinion affirmed a decree of the
Court of Appeals of New York (179 N.Y. 325), sustaining regulations re-
quiring large expenditures by landlords as a valid exercise of the police
power. Moeschen v. Tenement House Department, 203 U.S. 583 [1906]. To
require uncompensated expenditures very certainly affects the right of
property in land as definitely, and often as seriously, as regulation of the
amount of rent that may be charged for it can do. Many decisions of this
court were cited as sufficient to justify the summary disposition there made
of the question, as one even then so settled by authority.as not to be longer
open to discussion.
The judicial precedents clearly favor upholding reasonable laws which
inhibit landlords, and indeed, of almost any-public welfare-police power
legislation.9 4 Nonetheless, also to be considered is the unquestionably
present, albeit unwritten, factor of the socio-political and moral pre-
dispositions of the. judges. who must decide the case.- A measure which
attempts to legislate ethics and morals asks careful scrutiny. A question
which is always pertinent, though it may border on a judgment as to the
wisdom of such a law, is whether the state should impose a currently
popular commitment upon a minority who may violently disagree. A law
which strikes so close to home may cause some rethinking of the judicial
"rubber stamp" attitude now commonplace. The effect of such a law may
well be to relieve the slum situation but it is also to forcibly integrate
private apartment buildings and heretofore happily restricted areas. As is
indicated, a law as extreme as the New York City anti-discrimination
housing law may persuade the courts to recast their judicial eye now set
to look quite favorably upon all state social'legislation.
B. State-Federal Conflict?
Another argument against constitutionality rests upon the proposition
that state regulation of tenant selection conflicts, at least in part, with
these evils, it is necessary to assure to all inhabitants of the city equal opportt-
nity to obtain living-quarters, regardless of race, color, religion, national origin
or ancestry.
"It. is hereby declared to be the policy of the city to assure equal opporti-
nity to all 'esidents to live in decent, sanitary and healthful living quarters,
regardless of race, color, religion, national origin or-ancestry, in order that the
peace, health, safety and general welfare of all the inhabitants of the city may
be protected and insured."
93 258 U.S. at 24647.
94 In Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) the Supreme
Court finally put to rest the benighted juristic posture of the nineteenth and eirly
twentieth centuries in this area (see Rodes, Due Process and Social Legislation in the
Supreme Court - A Post Mortem, 33 NOTRE DAME LAw. 5 (1957)), emphatically
stating: "Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to
weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses
offends the public welfare." Cf. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
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federal legislation dealing with housing. This argument is raised since
landlords covered by the law include those who participate in FHA
financing procedures. The rule is that state laws which are found to clear-
ly conflict with proper federal laws or substantially burden their opera-
tions must fall.9 5
First, is there a clear conflict? Congress, despite extensive involvement
in the housing field, has remained silent on the question of discrimination
in tenant selection. The criteria now imposed upon federal housing pro-
jects concern solely the financial status of prospective tenants, their status
as veterans, or their preferred status as a result of displacement by the
federal project.96 On a number of occasions proposals to include non-
discrimination provisions in federal housing laws have been considered by
Congress but they have never been adopted. 97 Even though Congress
could not pass a law which positively sanctions preferential treatment of
any race or religion,98 it certainly could have forbidden discrimination. 99
What inference must be drawn from this silence? Did Congress mean
that discrimination should not be forbidden, or did it leave the states
free to make their own policy decision? Considering the magnitude and
seriousness of the problem the former inference hardly seems reasonable.
95 E.g., Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); United
States v. Chester, 144 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1944). This is a direct result of the federal
supremacy doctrine and its corollary the federal immunity doctrine. See Pennsylvania
v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159
(1819).
96 63 STAT. 422 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1415 (8) (1952); 63 STAT. 423 (1949),
42 U.S.C. § 1410 (g), (m) (1952). Regulations have been promulgated by the
Public Housing Authority and may be found in its Housing Manual, dated Feb.
21, 1951, at Section 102.1. They provide as follows:
"The following general statement of racial policy shall be applicable to all
low-rent housing projects developed and operated under the United States
Housing Act of 1937, as amended.
"1. Programs for the development of low-rent housing, in order to be eligible
for PHA assistance, must reflect equitable provision for eligible families of all
races determined on the approximate volume of their respective needs for such
housing.
"2. While the selection of tenants and the assigning of dwelling units are pri-
marily matters for local determination, urgency of need and the preference pre-
scribed in the Housing Act of 1949 are the basic statutory standards for the
selection of tenants."
Regarding these regulations, it was said in Heyward v. Public Housing Administration,
238 F.2d 689, 697 (5th Cir. 1956) that "they do not require that housing be made
available on a nonsegregated or nondiscriminatiory basis." (Emphasis added.)
97 Bills have been introduced on a number of occasions which would effect a
national policy of non-discrimination regarding the housing programs, including
FHA loan guaranty procedures. For an extended treatment of these attempts see
Brief for Defendants, pp. 55-57, Ming v. Horgan, See also Note, Discrimination
Against Minorities in the Federal Housing Programs, 31 IND. L.J. 501, 502, n.13
(1956); 99 CoNo. REc. 1428 (1953); Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 289, 893 (1954). The court in Johnson v. Levitt
& Sons, 131 F.Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955), based its decision on the fact that
Congress has remained silent.
98 This would clearly be a violation of the fifth amendment's due process safe-
guard. Fortunately there has been no such law enacted.
99 This would be a situation quite different from that which caused the Supreme
Court to bristle in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Conditioning the
benefits of the federal housing program could readily be justified on a purely con-
tractual level. See Johnson v. Levitt & Sons, 131 F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
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Surely Congress could not have intended that states when faced with this
malignant problem on the local level would be helpless to cope with it.
Secondly, is there a substantial burden on the operations of the federal
program? There are two possibilities: (1) that this no-discrimination pre-
condition would deter one from choosing to become a landlord, partic-
ularly an FHA landlord,' 0 0 or (2) that the resultant integration would
cause the value of the landlord's property to decrease considerably. As to
the first, the thrust of the state law is not directly upon FHA financing
procedures, and any effect it might have as a deterrent to participating in
the FHA program appears indirect and insubstantial at best.1° 1 Concern-
ing the second, although property values may be affected by forced
integration, this effect is caused by an ideology which is founded upon
and cultivated by a constitutionally objectionable commitment: Negroes
are to be treated equally except when they attempt to move next door.
To make this exception is to call them inferior citizens! Thus, this adverse
economic effect cannot be constitutionally recognized. Moreover, ex-
perience has already shown that such effects have not been as severe or
long-lasting as the vehemence of the objection would indicate. 102
No real burden on the federal housing program exists. Congress"
silence does not preclude the states from passing Fair Housing Laws' 03
nor do these laws interfere with FHA operations.' 04 They, too, may
100 To isolate the consideration here to FHA landlords when considering the
effect of the state law upon federal housing procedures is only reasonable. To con-
sider also the public landlords, i.e., local housing authorities, would be to belabor
a constitutionally redundant feature of the law. That is, no new duties are imposed
upon them by the state law since the fourteenth amendment requires non-discrimin-
atory tenant selection anyway, as pointed out in the text at pages 467-68.
101 Cf. Brookchester, Inc., Section 1 v. Ligham, 17 N.J. 460, 111 A.2d 737 (1955);
Stuyvesant Town v. Ligham, 17 NJ. 473, 111 A.2d 744 (1955).
102 See Comment, Application of the Sherman Act to Housing Segregation, 63
YALE L.J. 1124, 1130, n.39 (1954):
"Most observers . . . seem to agree that initial Negro entry into an all white
area may depress prices for a while. When this does occur, it is usually because
of a 'panic' effect on the part of some whites; the latter, feeling that the value of
the property will go-down, rush to sell it and thus themselves cause it to de-
preciate in value. In instances where this does happen, however, the price decline
is usually only temporary." [Citing WEAvER, THE NEGRO GHETTO 279-301 (1948)
and others.]
See also ABRAMS, RACE BIAS IN HOUSING 80 (1947); Mayer, Property Values: The
Effect of Integration and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 18 LAw. GUILD REv. 20 (1958).
103 Cf. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920) (upholding North Dakota's entering
the housing business).
104 In fact FHA has positively cooperated with these laws and seems to welcome
them, despite earlier policies to the contrary. See Tenth Annual Report of the
Housing and Home Finance Agency 43, 1956; AEAms, FORBIDEN NEiGHORS C.
16 (1955). See also HHFA, Press Release No. 1192, Feb. 9, 1957, where Albert M.
Cole, Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, announced the new
policy of FHA for New York:
"The new procedure requires that builders also be advised that they are expected
to conduct their operations in New York in conformity with these laws and that
failure to do so could impair their ability to qualify for future F.H.A. mortgage
insurance pending satisfactory correction of .the noncompliance!'
Compare Cole's announcement with his testimony before Subcommittee No. 2 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary on July 14, 1955, reprinted in Hearings Before
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 1, 381-96 (1957).
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become redundant in a constitutional sense, as is the case with the laws
concerning public housing authorities, if Ming v. Horgan'0 5 is decided
favorably to the prospective tenant and that position becomes generally
accepted. 106
C. Attacking the Classification
The decisive classification made in the New York City Law concerns
the type of dwelling owned or under the control of the landlord. To be
within the coverage of the law the dwelling must be a "multiple dwelling."
Any such classification is subject to testing according to the limitations of
the fourteenth amendment. As Mr. Justice Holmes stated for the Court
in Patsone v. Pennsylvania:10 7
We start with the general consideration that a State may classify with
reference to the evil to be prevented, and that if the class discriminated
against is or reasonably might be considered to define those from whom the
evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked out .. . . It is not
enough to invalidate the law that others may do the same thing and go
unpunished, if, as a matter of fact, it is found that the danger is character-
istic of the class named . . . . The question therefore narrows itself to
whether this court can say that the [legislature] was not warranted in
assuming as its premise for the law that [the class which the law singles
out was] the peculiar source of the evil that it desired to prevent.
With regard to the "multiple dwelling" classification, the question is
whether it is reasonable for the legislature to include within the class thus
defined apartment buildings of greater than two units and houses within a
contiguous group of ten or more owned by or subject to the power of
sale of the same person. It can reasonably be conceived that those who
are covered by the law are in the business of renting and selling housing
accommodations and, thus, that they are the ones signally responsible
for the evils resulting from housing discrimination.' 0 8 If such a basis can
reasonably be conceived of it is assumed to exist and the legislation, to
that extent, is valid and constitutional.' 0 9
105 No. 97,130, Dept. 6, Super. Ct. Calif., Sacramento County, 1958.
106 This effect would be achieved more summarily if the Supreme Court would
sanction that result. However, it is interesting to note that Banks v. Housing Author-
ity, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), was a significant case in this field,
was decided by the California Supreme Court, but was denied certiorari, 347 U.S.
974 (1954).
107 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914).
108 If this needs any demonstration, see, e.g., LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPLE V. PRO-
PERTY (1947); WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO (1948); AERAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS
(1955); To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
CIVtI RIGHTS 67-68 (1947); COMMISSION ON LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION, MEMORANDUM
ON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF METCALF-BAKER FAIR HOUSING PRACTICEs BILL 6 (1957).
109 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
This summary approval of the classification in the New York City Law is paral-
leled by that in the terse opinion of Judge Eager in New York State Comm'n Against
Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. West-
chester Co. 1958), upholding the New York state law. The problem there is a
slightly different one, however, as it concerns the relevancy of the classification
based on the presence or absence of an FHA, loan guaranty to the evil of discrim-
ination. For an elucidation of the argument which contends that this classification
violates the requirements of the equal -protection clause rendering the law -un-
constitutional, see the Opinion of the Attorney General of Oregon published in 2
RAca REL. L. REP.,746..(1957), See also Brief for Respondents, pp. 32, 33, New
York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments; Inc., supra.
[Vol. XXXIII486
Conclusion "
On the heels of a World War and an unprecedented economic boom,
and while this nation tried to adjust itself both externally and internally
as one of the powers of the world, the internal problem of the second-
class citizenship of the Negro loomed large--on social, political, and
economic levels. In 1954 and 1955 the Supreme Court forthrightly dealt
with it in one of its most critical aspects, public education, when the Court
decided Brown v. Board of Education. Subsequent years have shown
that something more is needed; the Negro problem still exists. Con-
spicuously, the Negro ghetto remains-hence this investigation of the
nature of that particular phase of the problem. Assuming that chief
among the causes of this situation is discrimination on the part of
landlords, it must be determined whether this activity offends our Con-
stitution and reflects a glaring hypocrisy in American conduct, or whether
such behavior. is merely the cultural result of permissible personal choice.
Judicially considered the problem focuses on the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution. The question is whether they impose any
duty upon landlords when dealing with prospective tenants to act other
than indiscriminately. The answer seems to be that there is such a duty-
to regard all persons equally-only when the landlord acts by, for or as
the state. The determination of when a landlord is so acting is the socio-
legal problem to which this Note is addressed.
At this time, only public housing authorities, creatures of the state,
inspired by the federal housing program, have been held to act as the
state. A pregnant opportunity to extend the duties imposed by the four-
teenth amendment to state-assisted landlords was presented to the New
York courts in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp. They chose to favor
the status quo. Since then, the involvement of government in housing
has increased tremendously as has the impetus to vindicate the Negro's
rights in court. These two movements have met; and the purpose of this
Note is to marshal pertinent judicial precedents to help furnish an answer
to the question whether the courts will declare for the Negro a civil right
to housing accommodations. Judging from the currently popular juris-
prudential commitment to let the legislature rather than the judiciary
create civil rights, and from the successful legislation being passed in
this area by the states, the writer would conclude that while the courts
may, there is little chance that they will choose to extend the present
doctrines in this field. In fact, to extend state-action ideas any further in
the field of housing would seriously strain the already severely tested
fibers of the concept of private property. The one situation which could,
however, go either way is the FHA-assisted landlord issue raised in Ming
v. Horgan. The bothersome problem there is that to find state action,
or more properly federal action, precedent has to be most carefully
handled and explained, since the government assistance and cooperation
is indirect when compared with the public housing authority situation.
But see Brief for Petitioner, pp. 40-47, ibid. But, it seems that the leading case of
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) and even its more recent
counterpart, Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), provide sufficient authority to
withstand this objection on equal protection grounds.
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And too, the facile avoidance by the court in Dorsey, placing the issue
with the legislature, was disposition enough for that court since they at
least had a real expectation that the legislature would act, but this
alternative does not present itself in the FHA case. Congress has made
itself sufficiently clear on that score by defeating several bills aimed at
conditioning FHA assistance.
It is hoped that the judiciary will synthesize the respective spirits of the
Shelley, Marsh, and Smith cases to solve some of the Negro's housing
problems while keeping a watchful eye on the landlord's sometimes
dwindling but constitutional and natural right to private property. And
the legislatures, where they feel that there is a need, indeed when they
recognize that it is their duty, should lead in articulating those dimensions
of the civil right to housing accommodations which their persuasions
recommend.
Thomas B. McNeill
